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CAPABILITIES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, INCLUDING
NAVAL THINKING ON ITS EMPLOYMENT
Extracts from a Lecture by
S. Parsons, U.S.N.
at the Naval War College
February 16, 1950

Rear Admiral W.

My lecture is supposed to be about naval thinking on the em
ployment of the atomic bomb. I find difficulty in separating naval
thinking from military thinking and national thinking in this case.
I don't think that you can draw any sharp or beneficial distinction
between them. They necessarily interact on each other and are
included under this heading of national thinking.

It

is necessary even to go into what we mean by thinking
itself. I have been impressed by the type of thinking which has
gone on since 1945. I've followed it rather carefully, and I have
been affected by it. I think the term "visceral thinking" applies
to quite a lot that has been done since 1945. There are inarticu
late visceral thinkers, who take a set of facts and draw some most
remarkable conclusions from them. The inarticulate visceral

thinkers are of the type who do not pay much attention to news

papers and radio programs.
we call propaganda.

They are almost impervious to what

They are also inarticulate because they don't

read much and certainly wouldn't think of writing very much.

Those people take a set of bare facts such as these : "We had to

land in Normandy; we had done a lot of bombing; in spite of that
we had to march through on the ground.

But when we dropped

two atomic bombs on Japan they surrendered." That's all they think
Admiral Parsons is presently on duty with the Weapons System
Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been
associated with the atomic bomb project since 1943 and was bomb
commander at the Hiroshima bombing.
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of, and then don't analyze it at all. That, I think, is behind a great

deal of the terrific worry and pressure which has prodded and
harassed the Atomic Energy Commission and has maintained the

atomic energy program. That is plain reflex-deduction from a set
of facts without any critical appraisal of those facts, what went be

hind them, or anything else. Their conclusions are drawn: "A sur
render of Japan occurred after two atomic bombs were dropped. A

surrender did not occur in Europe because atomic bombs were not

used."

The articulate thinkers, including some atomic· scientists for

the first several years during the pre-Blackett era of articulate
thinkers, created the concept of the "absolute weapon." They
were using "visceral thinking" but they were rationalizing and

dressing it up in very impressive language. That concept of the
"absolute weapon" was still obtaining in full force when I spoke here

in September, 1948. I found it necessary to go into it, to go into its
expression, its impact on concepts which were being reported as
war plans, and I had to work it over rather thoroughly. Then within
three weeks, Dr. Blackett's book came out. The British edition
that came out first, was called "Military and Political Consequences
of Atomic Energy." The American edition was titled "Fear,
War and the Bomb." The book is a most remarkable analysis. I
would say it is by far the best presentation. in English, of the
Russian point of yiew. It really sharpened the issues in this case
and it was a terrific shock to many of our highest-powered scientists
who had been associated with radar, atomic-energy development,
proximity fuse development, and had seen their work bear fruit in

important military consequences during the war. Dr. Blackett had

received the American Medal for Merit for his very fine work in

anti-submarine operations analysis during the war. He was -given

similar decorations in England, I believe.
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lished he also received the Nobel Prize for his work, beginning in

the early twenties, in nuclear physics. Doctor Blackett had been an

officer in the Royal Navy during World War I.
into physics.

He had then gone

He had about the best mental equipment for opera

tions analysis and scientific military appraisal of any scientist of his
time.

That was quite a shock, as I say, to our scientists who had

thought that their analyses of military consequences and military

tactics should be absolutely sound because they had used scientific

methods in producing them. This was a demonstration, by one of

the best equipped, best thinkers among physicists and scientists in

general, that you could take a set of facts, that you could handle

them in apparently scientific fashion and you could prove practically

anything that your apparent religion and philosophy demanded to

be proved, and do it, not in Russia, but right in England, using the
accepted terminologies and accepted operations research methods.

It was a terrible blow to our Operations Analysts and other

scientists in the United States to have one of their most eminent
members write this book. That was independent of the impact of
the book itself.

I have just given the impact on the scientists.

The book probably had a beneficial effect in many ways, because

it sharpened the issues and caused people to re-examine the facts

to see how Blackett could be combatted.

That was the beginning

of a new era in the articulate arguments on atomic energy and
its military consequences.

That illustrates to me a very necessary thing in working over

facts, particularly intelligence observations and in thinking of what
Russia, for instance, can do under certain conditions.

To go back

to Ptolemy and Copernicus, you can say that imagining the sun and

the stars as revolving around the earth because it "looked that

way" was an example of "visceral thinking" which was dignified

by some of the best so-called scientists for hundreds of years.
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accurate, correct interpretation had to be fought over for just that
length of time before people would actually look at this set of
facts and derive the correct conclusion from them.
I will now mention another recent shock. We operated un
der a semi-dictatorship in World War Two. We had absolute

priority of effort, and we got results like the Manhattan District,
production of aircraft and production of fleets. We then demob
ilized and concentrated on automobiles, television and like things.

But we forgot that Russia had not demobilized and was still op
erating under a dictatorship more rigid and perhaps as dynamic as
the one that we had operated under in World War Two. We did not

take account of certain little red flags that were flying. I'm lead
ing up to this shock that we experienced when the announcement
came out on the 23rd of September about a Russian atomic ex

plosion. We were quite shocked. But if we had thought of Cf'l'
tain things which had occurred, such as the obvious flying around
of wing jet fighters and many copies of our B-29, when we knew
how hard it had been for us to put anything like that number into

the air, we would have been less shocked.

Those red flags indi

cated that regardless of how inefficiently rail transportation and

various other routine operations were carried out in Russia, when

they assigned top priority to a job, it really rolled.

That made it

not too much of a shock to some of us who had been observing

those red flags flying.

But indicates the kind of trap into which

we can fall when we sit in one type of organization, one type of

climate, one type of pressure and try to estimate what someone

else is going to do, living under a completely different system with
uifferent motivations.

That leads me into one or two final points.

I was very

much impressed with the talk General Marshall gave this week
at the National War College.

I'll mention just one of his points.
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He was commenting on the old Army War College, but I think his

remarks applied to war colleges in general. He said that it is very
necessary to be as concrete as possible in plans and to get away as

far as we can from purely abstract statements. He warned that

the difficulties we had had with Army War College Command and

Staff schools and staff people, were their tendency to deal in the

abstract rather than the concrete. He gave an illustration occurring

at an early peak of activity, say in 1939, '40 and '41, when he, as

Chief of Staff, and as Deputy Chief of Staff before that, was fac:
ing concrete problems not very far away from the Army War
College.

They were taking it very easy with their two-week man

euver, or whatever it was called. He said that he would like to ex
pose them to some of the real facts of life, and the way it would oc
cur would be this: They would be given two-thirds of the neces
sary information for working out a problem on Saturday noon;
they would work over the week-end at highest pressure on those two
thirds of the problem; on Monday, they would be given the missing
third which showed that they would have to throw all their work
over the week-end into the waste-basket; on Tuesday the rules
would be changed, and on Thursday the whole solution would be
thrown out.

Citing the need for realism and concreteness does not imply
ability to predict events. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, retiring president of
Johns Hopkins made a pertinent comment when we asked him how

he had made such very good predictions of events to come. In the

last fifteen years, he has been credited with having hit the nail on
the head with many of them. In denying this ability he said, "I

don't think that it is possible for anyone to predict in detail what
will happen.

The actual event depends too much on pure accident

and the personalities of people involved."
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lessons of history, and get some reassurance from them with res
pect to the probability of the human getting permanently or too
tragically out of control.
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